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ABSTRACT 
The need to protect a turbine generator from abnormal 
operating condidtions is a given. Power plant operational histor­
ical data indicate that malfunction of the turbine protection sys­
tem (TPS) has been the initiator of many power plant trips and 
attendant losses of plant availability. Many of these documented 
events have been considered to be caused by improper or faulty 
action of sensors leading to false trip conditions. 
Whether in a petrochemical or nuclear power plant, the de­
sign and operation of the TPS is fairly consistent. It is logical to 
consider, therefore, that tbe unreliabilities found within the TPS 
at nuclear power plants will be similar to those found at pet­
rochemical facilities. 
Statistical methods of analysis to quantify the unreliability of 
TPS components are considered, along with the magnitude and 
root causes of lost availability attributable to the spurious func­
tioning of the TPS at nuclear power plants; identification of cor­
rective actions such as sensor replacement, multiple logic and 
artificial intelligence; and methods of analysis to quantify the re­
liability improvements which will result from these corrective 
actions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear industry data bases report that turbine related fail­
ures account for approximately one unplanned forced outage per 
plant per year [1]. Of the many turbine subsystems and compo­
nents, the turbine protection system (TPS), or more specifically, 
the electrohydraulic controls systems (EHC), has been iden­
tified as a principal source for spurious turbine trips. The EHC 
system is the backbone of the turbine protection system, con­
necting critical turbine components with the automatic turbine 
trip relay. Although new turbine protection systems are imple­
menting wholly digital systems with distributed microprocessor 
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based control, the majority of the installed turbine protection 
systems rely on the high pressure pneumatic EHC system. To 
supplement the protection afforded by the this system, most 
suppliers also provide a comprehensive package of turbine 
supervisory instrumentation (TSI) systems. These TSI systems 
can be designed, at the request of the customer, to initiate pro­
tective actions. 
Power plant experience indicates that the turbine protection 
systems often initiate turbine trips when operating conditions 
do not warrant a trip. In Table 1, the Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations (INPO) reports the listing of subsystems and compo­
nents that are typically associated with turbine trip events [2]. 
Table 1. Subsystems and Components Typically Associated with 
Thrbine Trip Events. 
Subsystem 
EHC System 
Governor/Control Valves 
Intercept/Stop Valves 
Instruments 
Pressure Regulator 
Bearings 
Oil System 
Shafts/Blades 
Miscellaneous or Unknown 
Percent ofTotal 
Turbine Trip Events 
47 
9 
6 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
20 
Clearly, it would be most desirable to eliminate spurious tur­
bine trips, but not at the expense of proper protective functions. 
The dangers both to operating personnel and to plant equip­
ment posed by turbine overspeed, shaft vibration, loss of lub­
ricating oil, etc., are very real, and should be reliably detected 
and avoided through comprehensive protection systems. False 
trip conditions, however, should be positively identified; and 
needless turbine trips should be avoided to the maximum extent 
possible. 
Research reported herein was sponsored by the Electric 
Power Research Institute and the New York Power Authority to 
investigate the numerous false turbine trip events which have 
plagued the nuclear industry, and to suggest equipment and/or 
techniques which can improve TPS performance and reliability 
in a cost beneficial manner. 
DISCUSSION 
Root Cause Analysis 
To identify the magnitude and root causes of lost availability 
attributable to the spurious function of the TPS, detailed 
analyses were conducted using industry data bases of nuclear 
power plant operating histories. Data from approximately 80 
plants covering the years 1978 through 1985 were included in 
the evaluation. In all, over 340 years of nuclear power plant tur­
bine operating history was studied. A statistical analysis of the 
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data, augmented by an industry survey and utility interviews, 
led to identification of areas within the TPS which could benefit 
from retrofit of corrective actions. 
The data were divided into groups based on the cause of the 
event. These groupings were further manipulated to obtain the 
equivalent outage hours expected to result from each type of 
spurious event. The expected outage hours were determined by 
examining the performace parameter, equivalent full power 
hours (EFPH) lost, which is recorded for each event. The EFPH 
lost is the percent capacity lost due to an event multiplied by 
the duration of the event in hours. For example, an event that 
causes a 20 percent power derating and lasts for five hours would 
have an EFPH of one hour. 
The EFPH is a function of the outage duration and is therefore 
essentially "repair time." From experience it is known that re­
pair time data follow the exponential probability distribution. 
Switch failure data are shown plotted in histogram form in Fig­
ure 1, and the curve drawn along the histogram indeed follows 
an exponential probability distribution. Since the failure data 
are exponential, the EFPH expected to result from the occur­
rence of a switch failure is best represented by the median, not 
the mean, of the data. Using the median value of each root cause 
grouping, the amount of EFPH expected to result from each fail­
ure type was determined. Finally, the EFPH expected to be lost 
annually by each operating nuclear plant was calculated. The re­
sults of these calculations are given in Table 2. 
An economic analysis of the worth, in terms of replacement 
power costs due to more reliable TPS operation, led to the con­
clusion that elimination of six to eight hours of lost power gener-
Table 2. Lost Power Generation due to Spurious TPS Events. 
Expected EFPH Expected EFPH Lost 
Root Cause Lost per Event (hr/yr/plant) 
Vibration 32.2 1.02 
Circuit Card 24.0 1.04 
Stop Valve 13.0 2.02 
Main Steam Bypass Valve 13.0 0.59 
Svvitch 12.0 0.76 
Personnel Error 12.0 2.76 
Other Electrical 8.9 0.33 
Relay 7.5 0.19 
Control Valve 5.0 1.48 
Turbine Overspeed Test 2.9 1.44 
Valve Test 1.1 5.20 
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Figure 1. Histogram of Switch Failures. 
ation would justify an expenditure of roughly $700,000 on TPS 
improvements. 
Potential Corrective Actions 
Numerous hardware modifications are available to increase 
TPS reliability. The following presents possible corrective ac­
tions for TPS problem areas identified through the preceding 
statistical analysis, and some methods of quantifying the reliabil­
ity improvement to be gained through implementation of the 
suggested corrective actions. 
Improved Sensor Performance 
TPS reliability can be improved by replacing certain trouble­
some sensors whose malfunctions were frequently noted. A sen­
sor may be replaced-in-kind or with an improved sensor whose 
design is intended to preclude previously observed difficulties 
inherent in the older design. Replacement of a troublesome sen­
sor with a new (but same model) sensor will provide immediate 
performance improvement; however, if the original sensor mal­
functions are due to worn materials or other similar problems, 
long-term performance improvement of this sensor can only be 
realized through application of a more aggressive preventive 
maintenance program. 
Beyond replacement-in-kind is replacement of a problem­
prone sensor with a unit which is technically superior, e.g. , re­
placing a level sensor having moving internals with a unit which 
senses level via a conductance measurement. A typical example 
is shown in Figure 2. In the latter case, there are no moving 
parts, and, therefore, less likelihood of sensor failure or false 
measurement. 
Figure 2. Hydratect Resistivity Electrode. 
Another sensor that often malfunctions due to mechanical 
wear is the shaft-riding vibration probe. Shown in Figure 3, the 
typical shaft-rider has a spring-loaded tip which rides against the 
shaft surface. It was the failure of this spring at one nuclear plant 
that resulted in a forced outage which lasted for about 100 hr, 
and in replacement power on the order of $120,000. 
One corrective action that could improve TPS reliability and 
offer greater equipment diagnostic capability would be the re­
placement of the shaft-riding vibration detector with the eddy 
current type proximity probe. Intuitively, the noncontacting 
proximity probe is expected to provide better performance than 
the traditional contacting type vibration probe. In addition to 
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Figure 3. Shaft-Riding Vibration Probe. 
mechanical wear, the shaft-riding probe design has some other 
disadvantages. Operation of the shaft-riding probe relies upon 
proper lubrication to prevent chattering, slipping, or bouncing 
of the probe on the turbine shaft. The probe tip must be replaced 
regularly, and internal components such as the spring that loads 
the rider tip and the spring guides can be affected by fatigue. 
Cyclic loading may change the spring constant or result in sud­
den failure. The probes may also stick, giving false low vibration 
readings, leaving the turbine unprotected. 
The eddy current proximity probe has some advantages over the 
shaft-riding probe. The proximity probe has the ability to detect 
rotor bow, eccentricity, and zero speed at low rpm. The available 
operational data on these two probe types are somewhat incom­
plete, but indications are that the proximity probe is replacing 
the shaft-rider on an industry wide basis and that the proximity 
probe has, in its short history, provided reliable operation. 
Relay Upgrade 
The mercury-wetted relay has been reported as a problem 
component in nuclear plant operational history. There are ap­
proximately 30 of these mercury relays in a typical TPS, each of 
which is hardwired to trip the turbine. Each relay is arranged 
in a 1-out-of-1 trip logic, so that the failure of any of the 30 relays 
can result in either a spurious turbine trip or a failure to trip 
when required. 
A relay manufacturer representative commented that the 
relay model is a highly reliable "workhorse" that can withstand 
millions of cycles. The relay is commonly selected today because 
of its high cycle life and quick response time. The manufacturer 
also commented that, although it is unusual, some customers 
have reported that the relay will stick in position if it has been 
sitting de-energized for a period of time. Since, in the applica­
tion of TPS these relays can be de-energized for months at a 
time, the use of the high cycle life, mercury-wetted relay in this 
system appears to be a misapplication. Extensive bench test 
data are available to prove the relay's outstanding performance 
over millions of cycles; however, no data are available from the 
manufacturer on the relay performance in applications such as 
in the EHC system where the relay is infrequently cycled. 
SHAFT 
RIDER TIP 
CHECK INSULATION RESISTANCE BETWEEN 
RIDER TIP AND PROBE CASING WITH 500v 
MEGGER. A MINIMUM OF 10,000 OHMS IS 
CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY. 
Since the mercury-wetted relay fails in the as-is position, the 
addition of a time delay to the circuit would not solve the prob­
lem. However, replacing the mercury-wetted relay with a more 
reliable solid-state relay would be one method of improving the 
TPS reliability and eliminating a problem component. The 
selected solid-state device would have to accept de voltage and 
allow only unidirectional current flow. A silicon controlled rec­
tifier (SCR) is one solid-state device that could meet these 
specifications. The system modification, however, is not just the 
simple replacement of the mercury relay with the SCR. The 
SCR operates at a low voltage level (-3 Vdc), therefore, a high 
value resistor would have to be included in series with the SCR 
to reduce the voltage drop across the SCR. Another circuit de­
sign change necessary if an SCR were used would be a modifica­
tion to the master reset circuit. A manual pushbutton reset 
would have to be added to open the 24 Vdc bus, interrupt the 
flow of current, and thus reset the SCR. Figure 4 shows a typical 
Mark I EHC trip circuit, and Figure 5 shows the same circuit 
with the SCR incorporated. The circuit redesign as shown in 
Figure 5 has an additional feature in that the illumination of the 
indicator light is reversed from its original design. The light will 
be energized when the system is tripped. 
Another solid-state device that could be used to replace the 
mercury-wetted relay in the EHC trip logic is the metal-oxide 
semiconductor field-effect transistor (MOSFET). The use of the 
MOSFET would, like the SCR, require the use of a high value 
resistor to reduce the voltage across the semiconductor. The 
MOSFET operation is similar to any transistor and would not 
require the incorporation of the master reset in the 24 V de bus. 
The replacement of the mercury-wetted relays which are dis­
playing a "fail as-is" type of failure mode with either a SCR or 
M OSFET will improve the trip system reliability by a factor rel­
evant to the improvement of the component failure rate. Relia­
bility data from IEEE Standard 500 [3] gives the following fail­
ure rates, A.: 
Mercury-wetted relay A. 
Solid-state relay A. 
2.411106 failures/hr 
= 0.69/l06failures/hr 
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Figure 4. 1!Jpical1Hp and Reset Circuit within Existing TPS. 
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Figure 5. TPS Trip and Reset Circuit Modification-SCR Re­
placement of Mercury Relay. 
These failure rates relate to the probability of successful opera­
tion (P.) of the relay. This relationship is presented in Equation (1). 
where 
t mission time 
d = duty cycle factor = operating time/mission time 
(1) 
Over an operational period of one year, the duty cycle factor will 
remain the same regardless of the relay type and the operating 
time will be taken as period hours of 8760 hr/yr. Using the failure 
rates presented above, the reliability improvement (or increase 
in the probability of successful operation) of the solid-state de­
vice over the mercury relay is determined: 
Jips 
= e -(0.69 X 10-6 X 8760) -e -(2.41 X 10-6 X 8760) = 0.015 
In other words, the probability of successful operation of the 
solid-state relay is 1. 5 percent greater than the probability of suc­
cessful operation of the mechanical mercury relay. To relate this 
1. 5 percent reliability increase to tangible values, one must con-
sider that there are 30 affected relays operating in a station with 
approximately 30 years of operating life remaining, then the 
number of mercury-wetted and solid-state relay failures to be ex­
pected from the TPS during the remaining life of the plant can 
be calculated. 
• Number of mercury-wetted relay failures 
2.41 X 10-6 (failureslhr) X 8760 (hr/yr) 
X 30 (yr) X 30 (relays) 
19.00 failures 
• Number of solid-state relay failures 
0. 69 X 10-6 (failureslhr) X 8760 (hr/yr) 
X 30 (yr) X 30 (relays) 
5.44 failures. 
From these calculations, it is found that the 1.5 percent relia­
bility improvement resulting from replaceing 30 mercury relay 
'Aith 30 SCRs equates to the prevention of 13.56 failures over a 
30 year plant life. It has been determined that if a relay failure 
occurs it \viii result, on average, in 7. 5 EFPH of lost generation. 
Therefore, this suggested modification could result in 102 hr of 
additional power generation in a 30 year plant life or 3.4 hr of 
additional full power generation each year. 
Multiple Logic 
An alternative to simply replacing a troublesome sensor with 
another is to improve system reliability by adding a second, or 
even a third, similar sensor. With additional sensors, it is possible 
to change the logic so that each sensor votes on the parameter 
being measured. Using Boolean logic and truth tables, the rela­
tive reliability of multiple logic configurations can be evaluated. 
To illustrate, these analytical techniques are used to evaluate 
multiple logic configurations for turbine vibration detection. 
The possible operational states for a vibration detector are as 
follows: 
� = The sensor is operating correctly 
f1 = The sensor is not operational, giving no signal or a signal 
that is recognizably incorrect 
f2 The sensor output is lower than it should be. This sen­
sor state could lead to an undetected failure 
f3 The sensor output is higher than it should be. This sen­
sor state could lead to a spurious trip. 
Truth tables can be used to illustrate the effects of the numer­
ous sensor states associated with multiple logic arrangements. 
The matrices shown in Figures 6 and 7 give all possible combina­
tions of sensor states for 1-out-of-2 and 2-out-of-2 logic, respec­
tively. The consequences or conditions resulting from each pos­
sible combination of sensor states are indicated graphically. 
Using these graphical presentations, mathematical expressions 
were derived that define the probabilities of critical events oc­
curring for each multiple logic scheme. These are presented in 
Table 3. 
Since the actual probabilities of occurrence of the sensor states 
for the proximity probe are unknown, with caution and educated 
experience, these probabilities must be assumed. The relative per­
formance of the multiple logic configurations is highly sensitive to 
the relative probabilities of the four sensor states, and slight 
changes in the assumed probabilities for sensor states can radically 
alter the recommendation for a particular multiple logic format. 
To increase confidence in the quantitative assumptions made re­
garding sensor state probabilities, manufacturers and service com­
panies familiar with the proximity probe vibration monitoring sys­
tem were contacted and questioned about the failure modes most 
commonly experienced with this type of vibration detector. Specif­
ically, representatives from Bentley Nevada, IRD, and Mechanical 
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Table 3. Critical Event Probabilities for Multiple Logic Arrangements. 
Single Sensor One-Out-of-Two Logic Two-Out-of-Two Logic Two-Out-of-Three Logic 
Probability of Correct P(�) P(�)[1 + P(f1) + P(f2) - P(f3)] P(�)[P(�) + 2P(f3)] 3P(�)2 - 2P(�)3 + 6P(�) 
X P(fs)[P(f1) + P(f�] Operation 
Probability of Condition P(f� 
Allowing Undetected 
Failure 
Probability of Condition 
Requiring Provisional Trip 
Probability of Condition P(f1) 
Allowing Spurious Trip 
(Lower Bound) 
P(f2)[P(f� + 2P(fJ] P(f�[P(f� + 2P(�) + 2P(f3)] 
2P(f1)[1 - P(f1)] 
P(f1) X P(f1) P(f1) X P(f1) 
3P(f�2 - 2P(f2)3 
+ 6P(f1)P(f�[P(fQ) + P(f3)] 
P(f1)3 + 3P(fll[P(f2) + P(f3)] 
Probability of Condition P(f1) + P(fs) P(f1) X P(f1) + P(f3)[2 - P(f3)] P(f1) X P(f1) + P(f3) X P(f3) P(f1)3 + 3P(f1)2[P(F � 
+ P(f3)] + 3P(f3)2 Allowing Spurious Trip 
(Upper Bound) 
Table 4. Calculation of State Probabilities. 
1-out-of-1 1-out-of-2 2-out-of-2 
Probability of correct 0. 985 0.996820 0.973180 
operation 
Probability of condition 0.00450 0.000101 0.008899 
allowing undetected failure 
Probability of condition 0.0 0.0 0.017838 
requiring provisional trip 
(investigation at sensors) 
Probability of condition 0.01050 0.003079 0.000083 
allowing spurious trip 
Dynamics Analysis, were contacted. There was a consensus among 
these specialists in vibration monitoring and diagnositcs that the 
proximity probe system most commonly fails with an open or short 
circuit, resulting in the probe sending zero ac signal. Additionally, 
some failures have resulted when the probe backs out of its 
threaded position increasing the gap to a point where no reading 
is received. Interviewees reported that it is extremely unlikely that 
the system would give a false high signal, but that a partial short 
could result in a false low signal. Based on the judgements of these 
experts, the state probabilities of the proximity probe vibration 
monitoring system can be more realistically selected as: 
P(�) = 0.985 
P(f1) = 0.009 
P(f� = 0.0045 
P(f3) = 0.0015 
By substituting these sensor state probabilities into the probability 
equations given in Table 3, the relative value of the logic configura­
tions can be determined. The calculated probabilities are given in 
Table 4. 
Further consideration must be given to these calculated prob­
abilities. Table 4 shows that the 2-out-of-2 logic arrangement is 
under a provisional trip condition 1.8 percent of its operating time. 
During this provisional trip period, the operator will be aware of 
a single sensor failure, but will not automatically trip the turbine. 
It is practical to consider that the six upset, provisional trip 
states shown in Figure 7 will actually result in other operating 
states. For example, consider the upset condition when one sen­
sor is okay and the second sensor is known to be giving an incor-
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- 2P(f3)3 
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POSSIBILITY OF UNDETECTED 
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Figure 6. State Combinations 1-0ut-of-2 Logic. 
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Figure 7. State Combinations 2-0ut-of-2 Logic. 
rect signal. Under these circumstances, it is most likely that the 
operators will act correctly to investigate and repair the faulty 
sensor and will manually monitor the second, good sensor to 
protect the turbine. It can be reasonably assumed that this oc­
currence results in continuous successful operation of the tur­
bine. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of this system 
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upset state is added to the probability of system success. The sys­
tem is in another upset condition where one sensor is known to 
be giving a wrong signal and the second sensor is indicating a 
false low signal. In this case, the system has left the turbine sus­
ceptible to an undetected failure, because the operator will be 
monitoring the one sensor that he believes is correct and will 
not be receiving a true reading. The probability of this system 
state is added to the probability of an undetected failure. Follow­
ing this logic for the six system upset conditions in the truth 
table, the probabilities of occurrence of the four state prob­
abilities for the 2-out-of-2 logic can be revised. A comparison of 
these modified probabilities with the other logic configurations 
is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Modified Calculation of State Probabilities. 
1-out-of-1 1-out-of-2 2-out-of-2 
Probability of correct 0.985 0.996820 0.99090 
operation 
Probability of condition 0.00450 0.000101 0.008980 
allowing undetected failure 
Probability of condition 0.0 0.0 0.000 
requiring provisional trip 
(investigation at sensors) 
Probability of condition 0.01050 0.003079 0.00011 
allowing spurious trip 
The modified state probabilities indicate that with appropriate 
action from the operators the 2-out-of-2 logic configuration is more 
likely to succeed than just a 1-out-of-1 logic, but is slightly less 
likely to succeed than the 1-out-of-2logic. The 2-out-of-2 configura­
tion provides superior defense against spurious turbine trips but 
is more susceptible to an undetected failure than the 1-out-of-2 
logic. 
The probability of the protection system failing such that the tur­
bine is vulnerable to the occurrence of an undetected failure is 
highest in the 2-out-of-2 logic; however, for this vulnerability to re­
sult in an actual undetected failure, an actual high vibration must 
simultaneously occur with this sensor state. Therefore, the abso­
lute probability of an undetected high vibration is reduced. On the 
other hand, it is not necessary for a turbine failure to occur coinci­
dent with a vibration probe failure for a spurious turbine trip to 
result. Hence, the possibility of the single sensor failure resulting 
in a spurious turbine trip presented by both the 1-out-of-1 and 1-
out-of-2 logic schemes should be a greater concern than the poten­
tial of one undetected failure posed by the 2-out-of-2logic. Neither 
the 1-out-ofl nor the 1-out-of-2 logic schemes would address the 
problem of spurious trips better than the 2-out-of-2 logic format. 
Incorporation of two proximity probes would also reduce repeti­
tive maintenance requirements during refueling outages. Removal 
of the shaft riders would eliminate the maintenance associated 
""ith the replacement of the shaft-rider probe tip. It is estimated 
that the calibration of the proximity probe would not require any 
more time than is needed for the shaft-rider system. In fact, the 
proximity probe is easily calibrated in place once the turbine shaft 
is at a standstill. 
Specialty Instrumentation 
One unique protective system that has been broadly applied 
in the petrochemical industry to ensure safe, reliable protection 
and control of refinery equipment is the PRETECT system [ 4]. 
This system has been designed by Trip-A-Larm Corporation to 
completely eliminate equipment outages caused by spurious 
trips. The claim is that, at least in the petrochemical field, about 
95 percent of system trips observed are caused by faulty sensor 
readings. This system has reported up to eight years of operation 
in a large number of petrochemical facilities without causing a 
spurious trip. There has been only one utility application, how­
ever, which was a fossil-fired power station for boiler protection 
and control. 
This system employs an end-of-line device (ELD), a com­
plementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) that is retrofit 
as close as possible to each existing sensor (see Figure 8). Each 
ELD is fed a constant de input voltage, and its output de voltage 
level provides an indication of fault conditions around the sen­
sor. Specifically, \\-iring between the ELD and the signal pro­
cessing logic is continuously monitored for: 
• Short circuits 
• Open circuits 
• Ground faults. 
Wiring beyond the ELD is monitored only for ground faults. 
For any fault condition, visual and audio annunciation alerts the 
operator of the condition. Similarly, in the event of a defective 
logic card, a yellow light illuminates a window stating "card 
fault." Such detailed information assists the operator in identify­
ing system disturbances that could othernise be mistaken as a 
condition warranting trip. 
The system contains other features and options such as op­
tional voting logic, time delay to protect against contact bounce, 
on-line testing of circuit cards, first out indication, and all mili­
tary grade componentry. 
PRETRIP CHANNEL 
� I 
SENSOR CONTACTS 
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LOGIC 
,.!. 
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Figure 8. ELD Installation Schematic. 
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The previously discussed corrective actions have the potential 
for producing improved TPS reliability in a cost-beneficial man­
ner. There are other approaches to TPS performance improve­
ment, either under development or close to commercial availa­
bility, which will likely form the framework for future TPS 
designs. Commercial costs were difficult to obtain, given the devel­
opmental nature of most of these approaches, so cost benefit could 
not be accurately determined. However, it is felt that turbines 
will almost assuredly be protected by using some of these 
schemes in the not-too-distant future. 
Artificial Intelligence Expert Systems 
Turbine AID 
Westinghouse Large Steam Turbine Division has developed 
an artificial intelligence (AI)-based diagnosis system for analyz-
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ing turbines on-line and identifying potential problems. The sys­
tem detects changes in operating characteristics, and evaluates 
such changes against an extensive rule base to decide whether 
or not the observed abnormality requires attention. The turbine 
AI diagnostic (Turbine AID) [5] system monitors operational pa­
rameters using existing plant sensors, with other sensors being 
added as required to form the necessary set of inputs to the AI 
software. A plant data center functions both as a local monitoring 
system and a data acquisition center. From the plant data center, 
operational data are transmitted continuously, via modem, to 
the centralized diagnostic center located at Westinghouse 
Power Generation headquarters. At the diagnostic center, 
software called PDS (process diagnostic system) translates the 
sensor inputs into a diagnosis and recommends corrective action 
if an abnormal . condition exists. Each recommendation is 
coupled with a corresponding confidence factor (cf) in the range 
of + 1 to - 1. The diagnosis, recommendation, and cf are then 
transmitted back to the plant data center and the operator. 
The diagnostic center is staffed 24 hr/day with turbine special­
ists who can assist the plant operators ""ith symptom diagnosis 
if the condition has never been seen before. These new episodes 
"'ill then be entered into the rule base, so that a similar condi­
tion occurring at another plant can be quickly diagnosed by the 
computerized expert system. 
The PDS software has been applied to the diagnosis of 
generator operation since 1984. The system, called GenAID, 
was under development for over nine years and required the use 
of over 10,000 rules. Seven power stations are currently con­
nected to the GenAID system, and reports of its performance 
are favorable. 
Turbine AID does not provide turbine protection in the tradi­
tional sense. Many events causing turbine failure occur so 
quickly that nothing but immediate action, such as tripping the 
turbine, can prevent damage to the turbine. The Turbine AID 
system does not add redundancy to the existing sensing ele­
ments, nor does it eliminate the need for automatic tripping ac­
tion on certain indications. However, this system potentially can 
provide significant savings by providing outputs in the form of 
either directed maintenance tasks or information regarding ob­
served abnormal trending, both of which are intended to head 
off turbine failures before they can occur. 
TURBO MAC 
Radian Corporation has applied its expert-system software, 
RuleMaster, to develop an expert system, TURBO MAC, [6] to 
assist in the diagnosis of vibration in turbomachinery. The focus 
on vibration diagnosis is because most difficulties with turboma­
chinery manifest themselves by some form of vibration. 
This menu-driven system allows nonprogrammers to create 
rules from examples; advanced users can create rules from 
scratch. It will explain reasoning on demand and can handle un­
certainty. Data from field sensors are manually entered into the 
system by plant operators. The system asks the operator ques­
tions until it has sufficient information to make a diagnosis. Infor­
mation from other data bases can also be entered to assist in the 
diagnosis. The system can be programmed to initiate responsive 
actions, such as turbine trip, given an appropriate diagnosis. 
Ultimately, the system will be configured so that the diagnos­
tic software remains in a central location, and each plant is con­
nected to it through a modem. However, the system is not in­
tended to be an online continuous monitoring system, but to be 
operated only when considered necessary by a plant operator. 
According to its developers, this feature will give plant person­
nel a feeling of autonomy which may be absent when using a con­
tinuous plant monitoring system with monitoring by an outside 
party. 
The effectiveness of the system has not been demonstrated by 
operation in actual plant environments, and the reliability im­
provement expected from its use is unknown. It is expected, 
however, to effectively reduce the time and manpower required 
for accurate diagnoses of vibrational problems in turbines. 
Expert System for Machinery Diagnostics 
Recognizing the possible improvements in plant availability 
from equipment monitoring and diagnosis, Shaker Research 
Corporation has developed an expert system for on-line machin­
ery diagnostics [7]. 
Although the knowledge-based system developed under this 
EPRI research project is limited to a vibration diagnostics sys­
tem for pumps, it can easily be extended for application to tur­
bine shaft vibration diagnosis. Unlike efforts based on pattern 
recognition, the EPRI system is designed to imitate an experi­
enced machinery vibration analyst by virtually automating the 
logic and decision making process. 
This online continuous monitoring system uses existing field 
sensors, but may require the addition of sensors for more data 
input. It also incorporates data from machinery models. The sys­
tem analyzes both short-term and long-term changes in vibra­
tion data, and diagnoses malfunctions using a rule base made up 
of the analysts' deductive reasoning. Many years of troub­
leshooting experience were used to develop the rule base for the 
expert system. 
The system monitors in steady-state, transient, and alarm 
modes. Signals are collected cyclically, and one or more spectra 
for each sensor are produced. Current vibration spectra can be 
automatically compared with baseline spectra from (new) equip­
ment, or last-cycle spectra to detect long-term and short-term 
degradations. 
The system employs vibration data analysis and error correc­
tion schemes that extract the maximum diagnostic information. 
These schemes include high-frequency envelope detection, 
runout correction, rpm variation correction, and fast fourier 
transform (FFT) processing techniques. Finally, the results of 
the analysis are assembled to automatically identify the source 
and seriousness of the vibration level changes. 
The software analyzes the spectra, and deems them either 
normal or abnormal. If abnormal, a diagnostic message is pro­
vided to indicate the probable cause; or, if the cause cannot be 
identified, because diagnosis is not possible, the system pre­
sents the information that a skilled diagnostic engineer needs to 
make a decision. 
While the expert system takes the drudgery out of vibration 
diagnosis by providing the diagnosis automatically, in most cases 
it \\ill require some additional sensors and a dedicated minicom­
puter. Moreover, the addition of this new equipment will result 
in some added maintenance for the instrumentation and the al­
location of precious air-conditioned space for the minicomputer. 
Still, this may be the preferred alternative to periodically per­
forming vibration monitoring with hand-held measurement 
devices. 
Advanced Simulation Technique 
Although the AI approach appears to offer the potential for more 
dependable turbine protection, an objection has been voiced as to 
the system's "digital" approach to situation assessment. That is 
to say, the entire range of possible status for the multitude of tur­
bine performance sensors is divided into a rule base of finite 
size. Even a rule base containing 100,000 entries would be of 
little use for assessing a particular turbine operational situation 
if the set of sensor conditions did not match verbatim one of the 
100,000 pre-established rules. The IOO,OOlst possible combina­
tion of sensor states would require human expert assessment, 
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but this combination of parameters might be intolerant of delay 
before corrective action is taken. 
DOCS 
A turbine surveillance system that could comprehensively 
monitor machine condition, trend parameter excursions, and 
point decisively to failed components, without depending on a 
truth table survey or human assessment, might offer even better 
overall protection. 
A technical approach that satisfies these needs is called Dis­
aggregated On-Line Comparative Simulation (DOCS) [8]. In 
the DOCS approach, failures are detected when the difference 
between continuously-measured system variables and their cor­
responding calculated model values are outside preset limits. 
The causes are located by disaggregating the model into sub­
models, which results in accurate isolation of failures. 
The DOCS principle is illustrated in Figure 9. In this exam­
ple, the system input, I, is applied to the simulation model of 
subsystem 1, and the real output of subystem 1 is applied to the 
model of subsystem 2. If the real output, Ov differs from the 
simulated output, OSv then the failure is in subsystem l. Simi­
larly, if 02 differs from 082, then the failure is in subsystem 2. 
SYSTEM 
��------------'��----------�" 
SUBSYSTEM 
SUBSYSTEM 1 
SIMULATION 
SUBSYSTEM 
2 
SUBSYSTEM 2 
SIMULATION 
Figure 9. Disaggregated On-Line Comparative Simulation. 
In practice, DOCS can be summarized as an organized way 
of feeding data gathered in real-time through a set of equations 
to calculate outputs, which are also measurable by sensors. Ob­
served discrepancies between measured and calculated outputs 
ultimately allow backtracking to the origin of a failure. 
The organization comes from the assumption that a subsec­
tion is totally isolated from its environment by monitoring all in­
puts and all outputs. A computer code is then generated that 
simulates this closed system. Using the actual sensor inputs, the 
outputs are calculated independent from the rest of the world. 
Hence, the only time a discrepancy between the measured and 
calculated outputs can occur is when there is a discrepancy be­
tween the subsystem and the model description of the compo­
nent, which is indicative of a failure in the subsystem. 
However, there could be a sensor failure providing a false indica­
tion of system trouble. Such a sensor failure can be distinguished 
from a system failure by removing the questionable sensor's sig­
nal from the model. Most of the available sensors on turbines 
are for the practical uses of turbine monitoring and are not suit­
able for determining power flow between subsections, as would 
be required by DOCS. Minimally, a full knowledge of the steam 
properties, valve positions, and all control signals for all the sec­
tions is required. This requires extensive flow, pressure, and 
temperature measurements, which have to be made indepen­
dently from each other. All power and mass flows as well as 
control signals should be measured. If this is not possible, the 
system would still be applicable, but failures affecting these un­
measured variables would not be detected. 
It is believed that the DOCS technique, when fully applied 
for turbine protection, will have the following advantages: 
• Detection of failures-especially useful in detecting failures 
that are not immediately obvious. For example, turbine blade 
erosion would initially manifest in slight changes in turbine rotor 
balance/vibration, though this vibration may be within accept­
able limits. 
• Location of failures-the disaggregation of the system for 
simulation allows the operator to quickly key in on the failed 
component or subsystem. 
• Identification and analysis of transients-failures can be de­
tected and located during transient and steady-state operation. 
Rapidly fluctuating signals can be accommodated. 
• Identification sensor failure-the system will be able to dis­
tinguish between sensor failures and actual out-of-tolerance tur­
bine operating conditions. 
• Monitoring-the system will not only act as a failure detec­
tion, it will also monitor system condition and predict future 
states of the system. 
One field application of DOCS has already been attempted 
with a simplified system model applied to an entire power plant. 
Taking a small portion of a plant (the turbine) and developing a 
complete, accurate model holds great possibilities in demonstra­
tion of DOCS. This arrangement would not only provide quick 
diagnosis of system operation, but could offer the operator guid­
ance in his decision making. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of spurious turbine protection system trips and 
subsequent plant downtime is not as serious as other operational 
and maintenance problems in power plants, but it still warrants 
attention. The annual average of six to eight hours of outage 
time, per plant, justifies expenditures, in 1987 dollars, of up to 
$700,000. Equipment and methods are available now whose 
costs are well within this limit and which can be implemented 
to improve TPS performance. Further, there are more advanced 
techniques, under development and/or close to widespread 
commercial use, which will form the basis for future TPS 
strategies. 
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